The Navya-nyaya, which has heralded a new era in the system of Nyaya in India, has brought a revolutionary change in the out look of the Nyaya Philosophy. It has systematized all the doctrines of Nyaya and Vaisesika under the single head of 'means of knowledge' (Pramana).
The Thought Jewel of Reality (Tattva cintamani), which is the most fundamental work of the Navya-nyaya, is composed by Gangesopadhyaya of Mithila and it deals with all the important doctrines of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, i.e. Philosophy, logic, epistemology, and linguistics, under the four books, viz. Perception (Pratyaksa), Inference (Anumana), Analogy (Upamana) and Word (Sabda). It has set a distinct standard for the scholarly discussion in the 12th and the 13th centuries in India.
Inference, the Anumana Khanda of the Tattva cintamani, is divided into thirteen chapters such as i) description of inference, ii) theory of pervasion, iii) means of knowledge of pervasion, iv) theory of reduction-ad-absurdum, v) generalization of pervasion, vi) comprehensional relation characterized by universal, vii) theory of condition, viii) the state of occurring in the subject, ix) consideration, x) purely positive infernence, xi) presumption, xii) members of syllogism and xiii) theory of fallacious probans. Thus, the present work provides a comprehensive view of all the aspect of inference. Also, the present work, with general introduction, Sanskrit text and English translation with explanation, is the most authorative manual on the Navya-nyaya theory of inference.
Dr. V.P. Bhatta, the author of the present work, is an established scholar of sanskrit trained in Nyaya, both traditionally and formally. He holds vidyavaridhi, from the Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Benares, India, and Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, Ca. U.S.A. Dr. Bhatta has served as the General Editor in the Deptt. of Sanskrit and Lexico-graphy, and also Vice-chancellor, Deccan College, Deemed University, Pune.
Dr. Bhatta has brought out number of works with exhanstive erudite introduction and explanations such as:
i. Epistemology, logic and Grammer;
ii. Distinction of Activity, Bhavana viveka, of Mandana Mishra;
iii. Theory of Expressive power of words, the Saktivada of Gadadhara;
iv. Navya-nyaya Theory of Verbal Gognition, the Vyutpattivada of Gadadhara;
v. Perception, The Pratyaksa khanda of the Tattva Cintamani;
vi. Word, The Sabdakhanda of the Tattva cintamani etc.
Also Dr. Bhatta has published more than fifty articles in national and international journal.
Inference (anumana) is one of the four means of knowledge (pramana) such as perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), analogy or comparison (upamana) and word (sabda) admitted by the Naiyayikas, which establishes or proves unknown things. Inference is used to know things which cannot be perceived directly. Almost all human beings use inference in one way or other in their every day life to know or ascertain things such as fire on the mountain, which cannot be perceived by naked eye.
However, inference (anumana), which is the means of inferential knowledge (anumiti karana), is two fold (dvividha). First is the knowledge of pervasion of probans (vyapti jnana, Gautama, i. 1.5) or the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between probans and probandum (linga linginoh sambandha darsanam,Vatsyayana, i.1.5). Second is the consideration of probans (lingaparamarsa, Gangesa, 2). Also, inference is two fold as inference for oneself (svartham) and inference for others (parartham). Further, inference is three fold as inference of effect by cause (purvavat), inference of cause by effect (sesavat), and generally seen inference (samanyato drstam, Gautama, i. 1.5).
It should be observed here that Indian philosophers were one of the earliest philosophers in the world to admit inference (anumana) as a distinct means of knowledge (pramana) (Gautama, i. 1.5). However, West too had a well developed logical system and philosophers like Aristotle propounded theories of logic (Art of Rhetoric, 384-322 B. C.); and its influence on Indian logic is certainly undeniable. However, in the Western syllogism, adopted by Aristotle and others, there are essentially three components or premises, viz. major premise, middle premise and minor premise; whereas in the Indian syllogism, (nyaya), there are five members or parts (avayavas) , viz. proposition (pratijna), probans (hetu), example (udaharana), application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana).
For inference (anumana), to become the means of knowledge and to produce inferential knowledge (anumiti), it should possess pervasion (vyapti), and the consideration (paramarsa). Thus, the knowledge of pervasion (vyapti jnana) and consideration (paramarsa) that 'Smoke is pervaded by fire', and 'This mountain has smoke pervaded by fire (vahni vyapyo dhumah)(vahnivyapya dhumavan ayam parvatah) to help inference to become the constitute means of inferential knowledge (anumiti karana). Also, pervasion (vyapti) in the form of invariable concomitance without condition (anaupadhikah sambandhah) is conducive to the inferential knowledge. Moreover only good probans (saddhetu), endowed with the characteristics of occurrence (abidance) in the subject etc; and not fallacious probans (hetvabhasa), is competent to establish or prove its probandum (sva sadhya).
The 'Inference' (Anumana Khanda) of the Tattva cintamani is fundamental work in the Navya-nyaya system of Indian logic. While the Nyaya and the Vaisesika-Sutras of Gautanm and Kanada, established inference (anumana) as one of the four means of knowledge (pramana) , the latter works such as the Tatparya parisuddhi and the Nyaya kandali of Udayanacarya and Sridhara respectively reiterated inference as a distinct means of knowledge (pramana) by refuting the objections raised by various other philosophers of India. However, the'Inference'(the Anumina Khanda of the Tattava Cintamani), systematized Indian logic by arranging all aspects of logic. which may be outlined shortly . follows:
Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is a knowledge produced by pervasion and occurence or abidance of probans In the subject (vyapti visista paksadharmata janyam jnanam ), as inference (anumana)produces inferential knowledge, only when probans is endowed with pervasion and occurrence or abidance in the subject.
Indian philosophers, especially the Mimamsakas, the Pracya-logicians and the Navya-logicians differed among themselves as to the exact nature of pervasion (vyapti) and defined the same variously, and hence, the 'Inference' presents all the important definitions of pervasion in the Anumana Khanda.
It must be observed here that mere freqneut observasion of probans and probandum together (bhuyo darsana) cannot constitute the means of knowledge of pervasion (vyapti grahopaya); rather, only the observasion of invariable concomitance of probans with probandum (sahacara darsana), os assisted by the absence of the knowledge of deviation (vyabhicara jnana viraha), constitutes the means of knowledge of pervasion.
Also it must be observed that reductio ad absurdum (tarka) is conduive to the knowledge of pervasion (vyapti jnana), by removing the doubt of deviation of probans from probandum (vyabhi cara Sanka); and hence, the 'Inference' (the Anumana khanda) has dealt with reductio-ad-absurdum (tarka).
Inferrer needs to know that all cases of smoke have pervasion by all cases of fire to facilitate the inference of the fire on the mountain from the smoke on the mountain. Therefore, it is necessary to admit the theory of comprehensional relation characterized by universal (samanya laksana) to know all cases of smoke and all cases of fire. Thus the 'Inference' states that the comprehensional relation characterized by universal (samanya laksana), enables the inferer to observe the pervasion of the probans of smoke by the probandum of fire on the mountain.
Probans, if it is to be concomitant with (pervaded by) probandum, should be devoid of any condition (upadhi) that is to say that it should be unconditioned (anaupadhika).
A condition (upadhi) is what pervades probandum (sadhya vyapaka) but what does not pervade probans (sadhnavyapaka); and thus the Inference' states that the entity, due to the deviation of which, probans deviates from probandum,constitutes condition. Also condition is a defect producing the knowledge of deviation of probans from probandum in the locus.
The Pracya-logicians believed that doubt regarding probandum(sadhya sandeha) and also desire to establish (prove) probandum (sisadhayisa) play a crucial role he the process of inference of probandum; and hence they held that the same doubt and the desire constitute the state of occuring of the probans in the subject (paksata). However the Inference' states that the absence of the ascertainment of probandum (siddhyabhava) qualified by the absence of desire to establish (infer) prpbandum (sisadhayisa viraha visista), helps inference of probandum; and hence the same constitutes the state of occuring of the probans in the subject (paksata).
Introduction: Man uses inference (anumana), whenever he cannot ascertain facts through perception (pratyaksa). It is not possible that all facts are ascertained only through perception. One has to resort to even other means of knowledge (pramana) such as inference to establish certain facts. For instance, it is not possible to establish the fact that God exists through perception; and hence one has to resort to inference to establish the existence of God. People all over the world recognize inference as a reliable means of knowledge, and use it to ascertain and establish things which are beyond perception in every aspects of life. Philosophers, were, thus forced to recognize inference as a means of knowledge (pramana); and include the same among the various means of valid knowledge.
Objection that Anumana is not Pramana
However, the Carvakas (T.C. II.1.2) object, that inference is not a means of knowledge, as, according to them, any means other than perception (apratyaksa), cannot be a means of valid knowledge (pramana). The Carvakas insist that doubt regarding deviation of probans such as smoke (vyabhicara samsaya) may persist due to the doubt regarding non competent conditions such as mind; and hence inference is invalid. Further, the Carvakas hold that the probans (hetu) and probandum (sadhya) such as smoke and fire in 'The mountain has fire, because of smoke (parvato vahniman dhumat). are seen to be deviating fromeach other dispite pervasion. However, the Carvakas explain the usage such as 'The Mountain has fire' (vahnyadi vyavahara) after the perception of smoke, from mere possibility of fire (sambhavana matra), or from false connection of validity to inference (pramanya bhimana) by conformity (samvadena) with other means. Thus, according to the Carvakas, inference is not a separate means of knowledge.
Refutation of Objection
The Naiyayikas (T.C. II. 1.3.) refute the Carvakas' objection. According to them, when inference is to be established as invalid means (apramana) through the sameness of nature with non-means of valid knowledge, (apramanya sadharanya), the means of valid knowledge, perceived to have the sameness of nature with the known means of valid knowledge, i.e. the perception (drsta sadharanya), becomes established to be inference only.
Also the Naiyayikas refute the Carvakas' objection on the ground that inference needs to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge, as other wise, the validity of perception too cannot be established. And perception cannot be established to have the validity intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself (svatah pramanya) without inference, as then the doubt regarding the validity of perception (pramanya samsaya) would become untenable.
Indian Logic
Indian philosophers were one of the first philosophers in the world to admit and recognize inference (anumana) , as a distinct means of knowledge. Aksapada Gautama (Nyaya sutra, I. i. 5) ennumerated inference as one of the four means of knowledge (pramana); and held it to be the most important means of knowledge that produces valid knowledge. According to Gautama, means of knowledge are four: as: (i) perception (pratyaksa), (ii) inference (anumana); (iii) comparison oranalogy (upamana), and (iv) verbal testimony or word (sabda).
Description of Inferential knowledge (Anumitih)
The knowledge derived from inference or inferential knowledge (anumiti) is one of the four valid knowledges along with perceptual knowledge, analogical knowledge and verbal knowledge. Gangesa (T.C.II.1.1) therefore, has defined inferential knowledge as a knowledge (jnana) produced from the knowledge of the occurrence or abidance of the probans in the subject, which (probans) ) is qualified by the pervasion (vyapti visista paksadharmata jnana janya). For, instance, the inferential knowledge such as 'Mountain has fire (parvato vahniman) is produced from the knowledge of the occurrence or abidance of the probans of smoke in the subject of mountain, which (smoke) is qualified by the pervasion of fire. Also inferential knowledge is defined (Tarka sangraha) asa knowledge produced from the consideration of probans (linga paramarsa), i.e. a knowledge of the occurrence or abidance of probans in the subject which is qualified by the invariable concomitance amounting to the consideration of probans.
Tarka Kaumudi (Nyayakosa) simplifies the definition of inferential knowledge as a knowledge caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyapti jnana karanakam jnanam) by dropping the aspect of the state of occuring of probans in the subject (paksadhamata).
It must be noted here that the inferential knowledge is actually the knowledge of the probandum (lingi jnana) produced from the knowledge of the probans (linga jnana janya ) (Tarka Kaumudi, Nyaya kosa). However, the inferential knowledge is two fold: as the one which refers merely to the community of locus (samanadhikaranya) of the probans with the probandum (sadhya) and the delimitor of the subjectness (paksatavacchedaka) and as the other which refers to the state of being the delimitor and the delimited (avacchedya vacchedaka bhava) in them.
Definition of Inference (Anumana)
The inference (anumana) is defined as the means of inferential knowledge (anumiti karana) (Tarka Sangraha, 45). And the means of inferential knowledge is two types as the knowledge of pervasion or invariable concomitance (vyapti jnana) and the consideration of probans (linga paramarsa) (Gautama Sutravrtti I. i. 5). The first is the knowledge such as 'The smoke is pervaded by fire' in the inference 'The mountain has fire, because of smoke' and it is produced by the perception of pervasion or invariable concomitance between the probans (smoke) and the probandum (fire) (linga linginoh sahacara darsanam). The first type is based on the Pracya-naiyayikas' theory that the means of inferential knowledge (anumiti karana) is a means (karana) and a means is an extraordinary cause possessing operation (vyaparavad asadharanam karanam). Here consideration of probans (linga paramarsa) constitutes operation.
The second type of means of inferential knowledge is the consideration of probans paramarsa) such as 'The mountain has the smoke pervaded by the fire' (vahnivyapya dhumavan ayam parvatah). And the second type is based on the Navyanaiyayikas' theory that the extra ordinary cause (karana) is the cause which is excluded from the non-association with effect (phalayoga vyavacchinna).
**Contents and Sample Pages**
Nyadya and Buddhism as the two important traditions of Indian Philosophical Thought distinguished themselves through a detailed inquiry into various aspects of Anumana. In both the traditions there flourished a long chain of logicians of great reputation and profound scholarship. Particularly in the Buddhist tradition Dharmakirti distinguished himself, through his scholarly works, as a renowned logician and exerted influenced alike both on his adversaries and followers. Although he has discussed a number of issues concerning Anumana in his different works no systematic attempt has been made to formulate and present Dharmakirti's unified theory of Anumana in its various aspects. The present work undertakes to do this for the first time in the world of Buddhist scholarship. Giving a sketch of the conceptual framework of Dharmakirti's philosophy by way of background, it discusses epistemic, constitutive and regulative conditions of Anumana according to him, and dealing with the validity and/or soundness aspects of Anumana along with Hetvabhasa it may give rise to, brings out their important implications not only for Dharmakirti's philosophy but also for Buddhist philosophy in general.
About the Author:
Dr. Mangala Chinchore (b. 23/09/1954) M.A., Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Poona, has been working as a Lecturer in Buddhist Philosophy for the last five years in the Philosophy Department of Poona University. Apart from teaching courses on Buddhist Philosophy she has been actively participating in seminars and conferences. Her earlier publication is: Vadanyaya: A Glimps of Nyaya-Buddhist Controversy. Besides, she has about a dozen papers to her credit published in nationality and internationally renowned journals.
Foreword by Alex Wayman Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction CHAPTERS
Indexes Author Subject Title
The present treatise is a valuable collection of 19 highly specialised and well-documented research papers contributed by erudite scholars prominent in the field of Indian Philosophy, particularly in the branch of Nyaya. These papers were presented in the National Seminar on Nature of Anumana: An overview of Indian Theories, held by the Asiatic Society, Kolkata in February, 2009. But for unavoidable circumstantial reasons, the publication of the papers after their procurement from the contributors is complete after the gap of five years.
Anumana or Inference received special attention of the master logician Gangesa Upadhyaya and his followers from 12th to 17th century C.E. In our day-to-day discourse the term Anumana is seen to mean 'something' with the help of an already familiar fact. A considerable part of our daily life is regulated through our knowledge accrued by the application of Attumana; in human life it is an effectively settled and undeniable reality. In ancient India, Anumuna has been noticed to have been used frequently in the intellectual disciplines and thus attempts have been made by Indian philosophers to establish, through Anumdna, the validity of a fact or to construct foundation of new doctrines. It has been further noticed that Anumana took the part of "the medium of convincing others about the conviction of each school of thought". Anumana, as accepted by our early philosophers, had a great role to intellectuals in understanding and finding out the exactness of a lot of apparently complex thoughts, ideas and expressions.
The Seminar on Anumana organised by the Asiatic Society had drawn the attention of a good number of genuine scholars as well as participants and imparted full satisfaction to their appetite of knowledge. Professor Subuddhi Charan Goswami is to be sincerely thanked for his studiousness in bringing out this prestigious monograph in a proper way.
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