Classical Indian Ethical Thought- A Philosophical Studyof Hindu, Jaina and Bauddha Morals

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Writing a book on traditional Indian ethics on which books are aplenty is by no means a novel enterprise. Yet, need for a book on the subject continues to be felt by students, research scholars and teachers of the universities to stimulate their thinking on newer interpretations. Books on the subject are often written in a historical perspective dealing with the ethics of the Vedas, the Upanisads, the Smṛtis and the philosophical systems in, more or less, a chronological manner. But that is hardly enough critical or philosophical to meet the need of the academic circle. The present work makes a sincere effort to fulfil that need.

Some books on the subject have been very ably written with a critical and philosophical insight. It is not therefore fair to complain that all books on the subject are of the same kind. Prof. S.K. Maitra's book Ethics of the Hindus may be cited as an example. The book is philosophical and critical, but it hardly takes note of the magnificent developments that ethical thought has made in the present century, especially in the West. At the time Maitra's book was published these developments were perhaps not very well-known in our country. The present work takes full cognisance of the recent developments in the Western ethical thought and its likely impact on the understanding of the traditional Indian ethics. That is the speciality of the present work. Moreover, Maitra's book, as the little suggests, is a treatise specially on Hindu Ethics. Ethical ideas found in Buddhism and Jainism have been occasionally dealt with. On the contrary, the present work takes equal note of the ethical ideas contained in Hindu, Buddha and Jaina traditions, while dealing with the subject in its special framework of presentation.

The distinctive developments in Western ethics have given rise to certain well-knit conceptual moulds, which, if properly applied to any system of ethics, can help us to understand the subject better. That is what I have tried to do in my present book. In course of doing this, certain reconstructions have also been made because material suited to these conceptual moulds are not always readily or directly available in the Indian thought. But to the best of my capacity, these reconstructions have been kept within legitimate limits so that they do not become jejune to the natural spirit of the Indian thought.

I have every hope that my present work will help scholars, teachers and student to understand the subject in a fresh light. If my hope is realised even partially, I will feel my labour to have been amply rewarded.

In my work, I have got valuable help, in one form or the other, from some of my elders, colleagues and students. I am grateful to them. The first who comes to my mind is Professor Nityanand Mishra, Ex-Head of the Department of Philosophy, Bhagalpur University. It is he who actually initiated the idea of writing such a book and also encouraged me from time to time in my endeavour. I express my heartfelt gratitude to him. I am also indebted to late Professor R.K. Tripathi of Banaras Hindu University who enlightened me on many intricate points.

Morality is man's special privilege. No other animal is moral. In fact, an animal other than man has neither the capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong nor it is liable to be called right or wrong for any of its actions. This is why morality or ethics is a world phenomenon in human sphere, meaning thereby that people everywhere in the world are bound by certain moral obligations. Notwithstanding the above fact, the Westerners have often disputed the possibility of any scope for ethics in Indian philosophical thought. This is obviously wrong in the face of the fact that there is a lot of do's and don't's for man prescribed in the various philosophical and religious texts of traditional India. These do's and don't's are obviously connected with man's conduct and character and it is in the light of them that an act of any Indian is called right or wrong, or his conduct good or bad. Still, however, whenever a Western thinker complains about the Indian thought that it lacks in any scope for ethics, he has two things in mind - (1) his own conception of ethics and (2) his conception about the nature of traditional Indian philosophy. Let us dwell here to some length on both the points.

About ethics, the Western mind has a set view that the question of morality arises only in a social context. Apart from a society, there is no scope for any ought. It is only in relation to members other than oneself that the questions of moral obligation arise. For a desert islander, there is no moral ought. But this is obviously wrong. Morality is based primarily on a distinction between 'is' and 'ought', between the demands of our lower animal life and those of the distinctly higher elements of human life. It consists in raising oneself from a narrow selfish plane to a wider self-less plane. And that is possible only when we are active on both the planes - individual and social. We know that the natural inclinations of any individual are towards the satisfaction of his sensuous demands which are unlimited. The natural demand of an individual is sensuous pleasure. But if we do not control our senses and are always engrossed in satisfying selfish desires for the attainment of sensuous pleasure, we could be hardly inclined towards our social obligations. Virtues like love, compassion, social welfare, social brotherhood can be practised only when we first regulate and control our animal demand of excessive sensuous pleasure. Self-sacrifice is the first condition of social morality. So, besides and before a morality which is social, one has to be moral on the individual plane. He has first to control his selfish desires, his unlimited sensuous demands, because only then he can turn towards a selfless social service which will bring happiness and good for the society. Controlling the senses is practising individual morality. Thus practising of virtues like indriyanigraha (control of senses), anasakti (non-attraction towards objects), niskāmatā (control of desires), cittaśuddhi (purity of mind) is as much necessary for being moral as the practising of virtues like love, compassion, forgiveness, friendship, brotherhood etc. The former are elements of individual morality, while the latter are elements of social morality. So, there is a place for morality even apart from a society. Even a desert- islander can be moral.

Book's Contents and Sample Pages