Development of Nyaya Philosophy and Its Social Context

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Item Code: NAD326
Author: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya
Publisher: Centre for Studies in Civilizations
Language: English
Edition: 2010
ISBN: 9788187586142
Pages: 725
Cover: Hardcover
Other Details 11.5 inch x 8.5 inch
Weight 1.60 kg
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Book Description
About the Book

The volumes of the PROJECT ON THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION aim at discovering the main aspects ofIndia's heritage and present them in an interrelated way. These volumes, in spite of their unitary look, recognize the difference between the areas of material civilization and those of ideational culture. The Project is not being executed by a single group of thinkers and writers who are methodologically uniform or ideologically identical in their commitments. It fact contributions are made by different scholars with different ideological persuasions and methodological approaches. The Project is marked by what may be called 'methodological pluralism'. In spite of its primary historical character, this Project, both in its conceptualization and execution, has been shaped by many scholars drawn from different disciplines. It is for the first time that an endeavour of such a unique and comprehensive character has been undertaken to study critically a major world civilization like India.

In his learned book, Development of Nyaya Philosophy and its Social Context Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya has traced the history of Nyaya Philosophy with reference to its social contexts. That this system of Philosophy, darsana, is not unnecessarily abstract but has taken cognizance of its theoretical ancestry as well as practical circumstances will be evident to the perceptive reader. As a branch of knowledge, vidya, Philosophy as darsana was known in India for a long time. In Kautilya's Arthasiistra the recognized branches of knowledge are four: (i) the three vedas (trayi), (ii) trade and commerce (varta); (iii) law and order (da1J-rj,anUt) and (iv) iinuisiki, which according to Kautilya means Sankhya, Yoga and Lokayata, However, later on anvi- $iki stood for logic and metaphysic. In the history of Indian Philosophy the first use of the term darsanahas been attributed to Haribhadrasuri, the Jaina philosopher and author of the Sad darsana samuccaya. Nearly 400 years after Haribhadrasuri the term darsana in the current sense was used by Sankaracarya in his commentary on the Brahmasiura. In this comprehensive book Professor Bhattacharyya has dealt with the works of most of the famous Nyaya thinkers like Gautama, Vatsyayana, J ayanta Bhatta, Bhasarvajfia, Udayana, Vardharnana and various other writers down the centuries. This scholarly book from the pen of Bhattacharyya is highly readable and informative. It is hoped that the book will be profitably used by researchers, scholars and the general reading public.


About the Author

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D. (Calcutta and London School of Economics), D. Litt. (Honoris Causa), studied, researched on Law, philosophy and history and taught at various Universities in India, Asia, Europe and USA from 1954 to 1994. Founder-Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (1981-1990) and President-cum-Chairman of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla (1984-1991), Chattopadhyaya is currently the Project Director of themultidisciplinary96volumePHISPC and Chairman of the CSC. Among his 37 publications, authored 19 and edited or co-edited 18, are Individuals and Societies (1967); Individuals and Worlds (1976); Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx (1988); AnthropolofSY and Historiography of Science (1990); Induction, Probability and Skepticism (1991); Sociology, IdeolofSY and Utopia (1997); Societies, Cultures and Ideologies (2000); Interdisciplinary Studies in Science, Society, Value and Civilizational Dialogue (2002); Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology and Other Essays (2003); Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background (2004); Religion, Philosophy and Science (2006); Aesthetic Theories and Forms in Indian Tradition (2008) and Love, Life and Death (2010). He has also held high public offices, namely, of Union cabinet minister and state governor. He is a Life Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a Member of the International Institute of Philosophy, Paris. He was awarded Padma Bhushan in 1998 and Padmavibhushan in 2009 by the Government of India.

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA, formerly B.N. Seal Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Calcutta University, taught philosophy for forty-five years in different Universities and Institutes in India and abroad. He has published several books, edited Journals and books in philosophy, both Indian and Euro-Amercian, and has published a large number of articles, discussion notes, and reviews in different Journals, Anthologies, Encyclopedias, Indian and foreign. He was Professor and Head of the Departments both at Burdwan and North Bengal Universities. Professor Bhattacharyya was also a National Fellow of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. He is currently a National Fellow in Indian Institute of Advanced Study (lIAS), Shimla.


D.P. CHATIOPADHYAYA, MA LLB, Ph.D (Calcutta and London School of Economics), D Litt (Honoris Causa) studied and researched on law, philosophy and history, and taugh at various universities in India, Asia, Europe and USA from 1954 to 1994. Founde Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (1981-1990) andPreslden cum-Chairman of the Indian Institute of A.dvanced Study, Shimla (1984-1991 h~ttopadh~a)'a is currently the Project Director of the Project of History of India SCIence, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) and Chairman of the Centre for Studies j Civilizations (CSC). Among his 36 publications, of which he has authored 18 and edite or co-.edited, are Individuals and Societies (1967); Individuals and Worlds (1976); .s Aurobi~do and ~~rl Marx (1988); Anthropology and Historiograph1 0 Sci.~ ~~ Induction, Probabilzty and Skepticism (1991): o.cio..~~ ~" ... ~ d TT • (1997)' S .. C ~~ ~~ , ~DlOCJ'\l an Utopia , oaet. u ures a s, <:,. , OJ •••••• U>')';;.';) gteS 000); Interdisciplinary Studies in Science, Society, Value Q Civilizational Dialogue (2002) ; Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology and Other Essays (200 Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizatio Background (2004); Self, Society and Science. Theoretical and Historical Perspectives (200 Religion, Philosophy and Science (2006) and Aesthetic Theories and Forms in Indian Tradit (2008). He has also held high public offices, namely, of Union cabinet minister ~ state governor. He is a Life Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a Mernl of the International Institute of Philosophy, Paris. He was awarded the Padma Vinbhsan in 1998 and the Padma Vibhushan in 2009 by the Government of India.

SlBAJlBAN BHATIACHARYYA, formerly B.N. Seal Professor of Mental and Moral Philo sold Calcutta University, taught philosophy for forty-five years in different Universities Institutes in India and abroad. He has published several books, edited Journals books in philosophy, both Indian and Euro-American, and has published a large num of articles, discussion notes, and reviews in different Journals, Anthologies, Encyclopedic Indian and foreign. He was Professor and Head of the Departments both at Bard and North Bengal Universities. Professor Bhattacharyya was also a National Fell- the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. He is currently a National Fellow Inline Institute of Advanced Study (lIAS), Shimla.


General Introduction

It is understandable that man, shaped by Nature, would like to know Nature. The human ways of knowing Nature are evidently diverse, theoretical and practical, scientific and technological, artistic and spiritual. This diversity has, on scrutiny, been found to be neither exhaustive nor exclusive. The complexity of physical nature, life-world and, particularly, human mind is so enormous that it is futile to follow a single method for comprehending all the aspects of the world in which we are situated.

One need not feel bewildered by the variety and complexity of the worldly phenomena. After all, both from traditional wisdom and our daily experience, we know that our own nature is not quite alien to the structure of the world. Positively speaking, the elements and forces that are out there in the world are also present in our body- mind complex, enabling us to adjust ourselves to our environment. Not only the natural conditions but also the social conditions of life have instructive similarities between them. This is not to underrate in any way the difference between the human ways of life all over the world. It is partly due to the variation in climatic conditions and partly due to the distinctness of production-related tradition, history and culture.

Three broad approaches are discernible in the works on historiography of civilization, comprising science and technology, art and architecture, social sciences and institutions. Firstly, some writers are primarily interested in discovering the general laws which govern all civilizations spread over different continents. They tend to underplay what they call the noisy local events of the external world and peculiarities of different languages, literatures and histories. Their accent is on the unity of Nature, the unity of science and the unity of mankind. The second group of writers, unlike the generalist or transcendentalist ones, attach primary importance to the distinctiveness of every culture.

To these writers, human freedom and creativity are extremely important and basic in character. Social institutions and the cultural articulations of human consciousness, they argue, are bound to be expressive of the concerned people's consciousness. By implication they tend to reject concepts like archetypal consciousness, universal mind and providential history. There is a third group of writers who offer a composite picture of civilizations, drawing elements both from their local as well as common characteristics. Every culture has its local roots and peculiarities. At the same time, it is pointed out that due to demographic migration and immigration over the centuries an element of compositeness emerges almost in every culture. When, due to a natural calamity or political exigencies people move from one part of the world to another, they carry with them, among other things, their language, cultural inheritance and their wavs , In the light of the above facts, it is not at all surprIsIng that comparati anthropologists and philologists are intrigued by the striking similarity between differe language families and the rites, rituals and myths of different peoples. Speculati philosophers of history, heavily relying on the findings of epigraphy, ethnograpl archaeology and theology, try to show in very general terms that the particulars ar universals of culture are 'essentially' or 'secretly' interrelated. The spiritual aspects culture like dance and music, beliefs pertaining to life, death and duties, on analys are found to be mediated by the material forms of life like weather forecasting, fOI production, urbanization and invention of script. The transition from the oral culture the written one was made possible because of the mastery of symbols and rules measurement. Speech precedes grammar, poetry prosody. All these show how tl 'matters' and 'forms' of life are so subtly interwoven.

The PHISPC publications on History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in India Civilization, in spite of their unitary look, do recognize the differences between the are; of material civilization and those of ideational culture. It is not a work of a single autho Nor is it being executed by a group of thinkers and writers who are methodological] uniform or ideologically identical in their commitments. In conceiving the Project w have interacted with, and been influenced by, the writings and views of many India and non-Indian thinkers.

The attempted unity of this Project lies in its aim and inspiration. We have in Indi many scholarly works written by Indians on different aspects of our civilization and culture Right from the pre-Christian era to our own time, India has drawn the attention ofvariou countries of Asia, Europe and Africa. Some of these writings are objective and informativ and many others are based on insufficient information and hearsay, and therefore no quite reliable, but they have their own value. Quality and view-points keep on changinj not only because of the adequacy and inadequacy of evidence but also, and perhaps more so, because of the bias and prejudice, religious and political conviction, of the writers. Besides, it is to be remembered that history, like Nature, is not an open book to bt read alike by all. The past is mainly enclosed and only partially disclosed. History is therefore, partly objective or 'real' and largely a matter of construction. This is one 0 the reasons why some historians themselves think that it is a form of literature or art However, it does not mean that historical construction is 'anarchic' and arbitrary. Certainly imagination plays an important role in it.

But its character is basically dependent upon the questions which the historian raise: and wants to understand or answer in terms of the ideas and actions of human beings ir the past ages. In a way, history, somewhat like the natural sciences, is engaged in answering questions and in exploring relationships of cause and effect between events and developments across time. While in the natural sciences, the scientist poses questions about nature in the form of hypotheses, expecting to elicit authoritative answers to such questions, the historian studies the past, partly for the sake of understanding it for its own sake and partly also for the light which the past throws upon the present, and the possibilities which it opens up for moulding the future. But the difference between the two ;mnro~rhp<: rnmt A. not be lost sight of. The scientist is primarily interested in discovering laws and framing theories, in terms of which, different events and processes can be connected and anticipated. His interest in the conditions or circumstances attending the concerned events is secondary. Therefore, scientific laws turn out to be basically abstract and easily expressible in terms of mathematical language. In contrast, the historian's main interest centres round the specific events, human ideas and actions, not general laws. So, the historian, unlike the scientist, is obliged to pay primary attention to the circumstances of the events he wants to study. Consequently, history, like most other humanistic disciplines, is concrete and particularist. This is not to deny the obvious truth that historical events and processes consisting of human ideas and actions show some trend or other and weave some pattern or other. If these trends and patterns were not there at all in history, the study of history as a branch of knowledge would not have been profitable or instructive. But one must recognize that historical trends and patterns, unlike scientific laws and theories, are not general or purported to be universal in their scope.

The aim of this Project is to discover the main aspects of Indian culture and present them in an interrelated way. Since our culture has influenced, and has been influenced by, the neighbouring cultures of West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South-East Asia, attempts have been made here to trace and study these influences in their mutuality. It is well known that during the last three centuries, European presence in India, both political and cultural, has been very widespread. In many volumes of the Project considerable attention has been paid to Europe and through Europe to other parts of the world. For the purpose of a comprehensive cultural study of India, the existing political boundaries of the South Asia of today are more of a hindrance than help. Cultures, like languages, often transcend the bounds of changing political territories. If the inconstant political geography is not a reliable help to the understanding of the layered structure and spread of culture, a somewhat comparable problem is encountered in the area of historical periodization. Periodization or segmenting time is a very tricky affair. When exactly one period ends and another begins is not precisely ascertainable. The periods of history designated as ancient, medieval and modern are purely conventional and merely heuristic in character. The varying scopes of history, local, national and continental or universal, somewhat like the periods of history, are unavoidably fuzzy and shifting. Amidst all these difficulties, the volume-wise details have been planned and worked out by the editors in consultation with the Project Director and the General Editor. I believe that the editors of different volumes have also profited from the reactions and suggestions of the contributors of individual chapters in planning the volumes.

Another aspect of Indian history which the volume-editors and contributors of the Project have carefully dealt with is the distinction and relation between civilization and culture. The material conditions which substantially shaped Indian civilization have been discussed in detail. From agriculture and industry to metallurgy and technology, from physics and chemical practices to the life sciences and different systems of medicines- all the branches of knowledge and skill which directly affect human life-form the heart of this Project. Since the periods covered by the PHISPC are extensive-prehistory, proto- history, early history, medieval history and modern history of India-we do not claim to have gone into all the relevant material conditions of human life. We had to be selective. Therefore, one should not be surprised if one finds that only some material aspects of Indian civilization have received our pointed attention, while the rest have been dealt with in principle or only alluded to.

One of the main aims of the Project has been to spell out the first principles of the philosophy of different schools, both pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The basic ideas of Buddhism,Jainism and Islam have been given their due importance. The special position accorded to philosophy is to be understood partly in terms of its proclaimed unifying character and partly to be explained in terms of the fact that different philosophical systems represent alternative world-views, cultural perspectives, their conflict and mutual assimilation.

Most of the volume-editors and at their instance the concerned contributors have followed a middle path between the extremes of narrativism and theoreticism. The underlying idea has been this: If in the process of working out a comprehensive Project like this every contributor attempts to narrate all those interesting things that he has in the back of his mind, the enterprise is likely to prove unmanageable. If, on the other hand, particular details are consciously forced into a fixed mould or pre-supposed theoretical structure, the details lose their particularity and interesting character. Therefore, depending on the nature of the problem of discourse, most of the writers have tried to reconcile in their presentation, the specificity of narrativism and the generality of theoretical orientation. This is a conscious editorial decision. Because, in the absence of a theory, however inarticulate it may be, the factual details tend to fall apart. Spiritual network or theoretical orientation makes historical details not only meaningful but also interesting and enjoyable.

Another editorial decision which deserves spelling out is the necessity or avoidability of duplication of the same theme in different volumes or even in the same volume. Certainly, this Project is not an assortment of several volumes. Nor is any volume intended to be a miscellany. This Project has been designed with a definite end in view and has a structure of its own. The character of the structure has admittedly been influenced by the variety of the themes accommodated within it. Again it must be understood that the complexity of structure is rooted in the aimed integrality of the Project itself.

Long and in-depth editorial discussion has led us to several unanimous conclusions. Firstly, our Project is going to be unique, unrivalled and discursive in its attempt to integrate different forms of science, technology, philosophy and culture. Its comprehensive scope, continuous character and accent on culture distinguish it from the works of such Indian authors as P.C. Ray, B.N. Seal, Binoy Kumar Sarkar and S. . Sen and also from such Euro- American writers as Lynn Thorndike, George Sarton and Joseph Needham. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that it is for the first time that an endeavour of so comprehensive a character, in its exploration of the social, philosophical and cultural characteristics of a distinctive world civilization-that of India-has been attempted in the domain of scholarship.

reductionism, materialistic or spiritualistic. The internal dialectics of organicism without reductionism allows fuzziness, discontinuity and discreteness within limits. Thirdly, positively speaking, different modes of human experience-scientific, artistic, etc., have their own individuality, not necessarily autonomy. Since all these modes are modification and articulation of human experience, these are bound to have between them some finely graded commonness. At the same time, it has been recognized that reflection on different areas of experience and investigation brings to light new insights and findings. Growth of knowledge requires humans, in general, and scholars, in particular, to identify the distinctness of different branches of learning. Fourthly, to follow simultaneously the twin principles of: (a) individuality of human experience as a whole, and (b) individuality of diverse disciplines, are not at all an easy task. Overlap of themes and duplication of the terms of discourse become unavoidable at times. For example, in the context of Dharmasiistra; the writer is bound to discuss the concept of value. The same concept also figures in economic discourse and also occurs in a discussion on fine arts. The conscious editorial decision has been that, while duplication should be kept to its minimum, for the sake of intended clarity of the themes under discussion, their reiteration must not be avoided at high intellectual cost. Fifthly, the scholars working on the Project are drawn from widely different' disciplines. They have brought to our notice an important fact that has clear relevance to our work. Many of our contemporary disciplines like economics and sociology did not exist, at least not in their present form,just two centuries ago or so. For example, before the middle of nineteenth century, sociology as a distinct branch of knowledge was unknown. The term is said to have been coined first by the French philosopher Auguste Comte in 1838. Obviously, this does not mean that the issues discussed in sociology were not there. Similarly, Adam Smith's (1723-90) famous work The Wealth of Nations is often referred to as the first authoritative statement of the principles of (what we now call) economics. Interestingly enough, the author was equally interested in ethics and jurisprudence. It is clear from history that the nature and scope of different disciplines undergo change, at times very radically, over time. For example, in India by 'Arthasiistra' does not mean the science of economics as understood today. Besides the principles of economics, the Arthasiistra of ancient India discusses at length those of governance, diplomacy and military science.

Sixthly, this brings us to the next editorial policy followed in the Project. We have tried to remain very conscious of what may be called indeterminacy or inexactness of translation. When a word or expression of one language is translated into another, some loss of meaning or exactitude seems to be unavoidable. This is true not only in the bilingual relations like Sanskrit-English and Sanskrit-Arabic, but also in those of Hindi- Tamil and Hindi-Bengali. In recognition of the importance of language-bound and context-relative character of meaning we have solicited from many learned scholars, contributions, written in vernacular languages. In order to minimize the miseffect of semantic inexactitude we have solicited translational help of that type of bilingual scholars who know both English and the concerned vernacular language, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali or Marathi. Seventhly and finally, perhaps the place of technology as a branch of knowledge in the composite universe of science and art merits some elucidation. Technology has been conceived in very many ways, e.g., as autonomous, as 'standing reserve', as liberating or Secondly, we try to show the linkages between different branches of learning as different modes of experience in an organic manner and without resorting to a kind of B. enl~rgemental, and alienative or estrangemental force. The studies undertaken by the Project show that, in spite of its much emphasized mechanical and alienative characteristics, technology embodies a very useful mode of knowledge that is peculiar to man. The Greek root words of technology are techne (art) and logos (science). This is the basic justification of recognizing technology as closely related to both epistemology, the discipline of valid knowledge, and axiology, the discipline of freedom and values. It is in this context that we are reminded of the definition of man as homo technikos. In Sanskrit, the word closest to techne is kala which means any practical art, any mechanical or fine art. In the Indian tradition, in Saivatantra, for example, among the arts (kalii) are counted dance, drama, music, architecture, metallurgy, knowledge of dictionary, encyclopedia and prosody. The closeness of the relation between arts and sciences, technology and

other forms of knowledge are evident from these examples and was known to the snafu people. The human quest for knowledge inyoJrt'J the a e o( both head and hand.

Without mind, I body i a' Corpse and the disembodied mind is a bare abstraction. Even (or our appreciation of what is beautiful and the creation of what is valuable, we are required to exercise both our intellectual competence and physical capacity. In a manner of speaking, one might rightly affirm that our psychosomatic structure is a functional connector between what we are and what we could be, between the physical and the beyond. To suppose that there is a clear-cut distinction between the physical world and the psychosomatic one amount to denial of the possible emergence of higher logico- mathematical, musical and other capacities. The very availability of aesthetic experience and creation proves that the supposed distinction is somehow overcome by what may be called the bodily self or embodied mind.

The ways of classification of arts and sciences are neither universal nor permanent. In the Indian tradition, in the Rgoeda, for example, vidyas (or sciences) are said to be four in number: (i) Trayz, the triple Veda; (ii) Anvz~ikz, logic and metaphysics; (iii) Danda-niti, science of governance; (iv) Vartta, practical arts such as agriculture, commerce, medicine, ete. Manu speaks of a fifth vidya, viz., Atma-vidya, knowledge of self or of spiritual truth. According to many others, vidya has fourteen divisions, viz., the four Vedas, the six Vedangas, the Puriinas, the Mammas, Maya, and Dharma or law. At times, the four Upa-vedas are also recognized by some as Vida. Kales are said to be 33 or even 64.

In the classical tradition of India, the word sister has at times been used as synonym of Vida. Vidal denotes instrument of teaching, manual or compendium of rules, religious or scientific treatise. The word siesta is usually found after the word referring to the subject of the book, e.g., Dharma-siesta, Artha-siistra; Alamkdra-sdstra and Moksa-sdstra. Two other words which have been frequently used to denote different branches of knowledge are jiving and viridian. While jiving means knowing, knowledge, especially the higher form of it; viridian stands for the act of distinguishing or discerning, understanding, comprehending and recognizing. It means worldly or profane knowledge as distinguished from jiving, knowledge of the divine.




  Table of Transliteration XXI
  General Introduction xxiii
  D.P. Chattopadhyaya  
  Part One  
  Section I: Gautama  
  Preface 3
  Introduction 4
A. History of Indian Terms for 'Philosophy' 4
B. The Text of Gautama 6
C. Development of Indian Philosophical Systems 7
D. History of Nyaya 10
  Instrument of the Cognition (Pramii:1Ja) 23
  Definitions of Pramiinas and Objects of Knowledge (Prameya) 25
  Doubt (Sawaya) 26
  Purpose (Prayojana) 28
  Example (Dr~tiinta) 29
  Tenets (Siddhiinta) 29
  Inference (Anumiina) 30
  Five Members of a Syllogism (Avayava) 30
  Argument (Tarka) 33
  Establishment of One's Own Position (Nin:taya) 33
  Discussion (Viida) 34
  Sophistry (jalpa) 34
  Cavil (Vitar.l4ii) 34
  Fallacies of the Reason (Hetviibhiisa) 35
  Quibble (Chala) 36
  Futile Rejoincers (Jati) 37
  Ways of Losing an Argument \ igrahasthana) 41
  Definitions of Pramd 44
  Objections to Perception 44
  Objections to Upamdna 47
  Definitions of Verbal Knowledge 47
  Non-eternity of Sound: Arguments For and Against 48
  Authority of the Vedas 51
  Gautama's Criticism of Other Ways of Knowing 55
  Transformation of Written Letters 57
  Words and their Meanings 60
  Some Special Objects of Knowledge 62
  The Self is not the Internal Sense Organ (Antal:tkarar,ta) 64
  The Body 65
  The Nature of Sense Organs 66
  Difference of Sense Organs 68
  Nature of Knowledge 70
  Consciousness and Other States of the Self 75
  Refutation of Momentariness 76
  How many Manas in a Body? 77
  The Origin and the Nature of the Human Body 78
  The Nature of Defects (Do~a) 79
  The Nature of Rebirth (Pretyabhava) 80
  Criticism of Different Philosophical Theories 80
  Fruition (Phala) 84
  The Nature of Pain 85
  Possibility of Liberation (Apavarga) 85
  Nature of Release 87
  Social Influence  
  The Nature of Different Pramdnas 90
  A. Perception (Pratya~a) 90
  B.Inference (Anumana) 91
  Debate 92
  Nature of Release and the Method of Attaining Release 92
  Section II: Vatsyayana  
  Preface 95
  Vatsyayana's Definition of Pramdna 97
  Objects of Knowledge (Prameya) 98
  Quibble (Chala) 104
  Different Types of Pramana 106
  Science of Reasoning 113
  Fallacy (Hetviibhiisa) 115
  Doubt (SarhSaya) 116
  List of Prameyas 118
  Inference of the Self 124
  Highest Good 125
  Defect (Do$a) 128
  Rebirth 128
  Fruition (Phala) 129
  Pain (Dul},kha) 131
  Authority of the Vedas 132
  Final Release (Apavarga) 134
  God 137
  Section III: Uddyotakara  
  Preface 139
  Uddyotakara's Comment on Vatsyayana's Introduction 140
  Nature and Objects of Cognition 143
  Doubt, Purpose, Example and Tenets 144
  Argument (Tarka) 146
  Ascertainment (Nir7Jaya) 148
  Discussion (Viida) 149
  Ways of Losing an Argument 152
  Nature of Perception 156
  Criticism of Different Theories of Perception 160
  Reasoning 163
  Criticism of Different Theories of Inference 169
  Five Members of a Syllogism 171
  Nature of Analogy (Upamiina) 178
  Testimony (Sabda) 178
  Conception of the Highest Good 183
  Nature of the Soul (Atman) 183
  Eternality of Self and its Killing 188
  Nature of the Body (Sarira) 189
  Nature of Sense Organs (Indriyas) 190
  Examination of Other Theories 198
  Nature of Activity, Defects Rebirth, Fruition and Pain 199
  A Final Release 201
  God (isvara) 202
  Part Two  
  General Preface to the Part Two 207
  Section I: Jayanta Bhatta 209
  Preface 210
  Introduction 210
  Merit and Demerit, Heaven and Hell are Only Knowable from Scriptures 211
  Justification of the Study of the Logic of Gautama 212
  Definitions of Pramana 218
  The Word 'Non-erroneous' 219
  The Buddhists' Definition of Determinate Perception 222
  Cognition of Transcendental Perception 223
  Theories of Error 224
  Inference 233
  Analogy (UPamiina) 237
  Sabda 241
  The Justification of the Authority DE Speech 246
  Eternality of Sound 251
  Meaning of Words and Sentences 256
  Meaning of the Vedas 260
  Inefficacy of'the Study of Grammar 266
  The Objects of Knowledge 266
A. Self 267
B .Body 268
  Liberation 268
  Section II: bhasarvajna  
  Preface 271
  Nyiiyasiira 272
  Nyiiya-Bhu~a1'}a 272
  Tarkadzpikii-Jayasirhha Suri 274
  Padapancikii-Vasudeva Suri 276
  Section III: Vacaspati Misra  
  Preface 279
  Introduction 280
  Subject Matter and Purpose 281
  Objects of Knowledge 283
  The Whole and the Parts 284
  Sound is Non-eternal 285
  Instruments of Knowledge 286
A. Perception 286
B. Inference 287
C. Analogy 288
D. Verbal Testimony 289
  E.Criticism of Other Theories of Instrument of Knowledge 289
  The Nature of a Syllogism 290
  Doubt 291
  Fallacies of the Hetu 291
  Causation 292
  Falsity of Everything Refuted 293
  Destruction and Production 294
  The Self is not the Sense Organ 294
  The Concept of God 294
  Section IV: U dayana  
  Preface 297
  Introduction 298
A. La~a1Javarz 298
B. Laksanamdlii 299
C. Atmatattvaviveka 300
  Momen tariness 300
  Unreality of External Objects 303
  Non-difference between a Quality and a Quality-possessor 306
  Non-experience of the Self Different from the Body 307
  Establishment of God and the Authority of the Vedas 309
  Final Release 309
D. Nyaya-kusumaiijali 310
  The Intrinsic Validity of Knowledge 314
  Proofs for the Existence of God 317
  E. Nyiiya-Parisi~ta 323
  Futile Rejoinders 323
  Ways of Losing an Argument 325
  Sesa Sarangadhara, Nyiiyamuktiivali, a Commentary on Udayana's Laksanauali 326
  Narayana Acarya, Dipikii, a Commentary on Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka 328
  Sarnkara Misra, Kalpalata, a Commentary on Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka 328
  Raghunatha Siromani, Didhiti, a Commentary on Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka 330
  Vardhamana, Prakdsa, a Commentary on Udayana's Nyiiya-kusumiiiijali 330
  Rucidatta Misra, Makaranda, a Supercommentary on Vardhamana's Commentary 333
  Samkara Misra, Amoda, a Commentary on Udayana's Nyiiya-kusumiiiijali 334
  Vardhamana, Priikiisa, a Commentary on Udayana's Nyayaparisi~ta 335
  Section V: Varadaraja  
  Preface 337
  Vyiikhyii-Cinnambhaga 338
  Nisiintika-Mallinatha 338
  Section VI: Samkara Misra  
  Viidivonada 341
  Bhedaratna 345
  Part Three  
  General Preface to Part Three 351
  Section I: Kesava Misra  
  Preface 353
  Introduction 354
  Objects of Knowledge 357
  Commentary by Cinnambhatta 363
  Section II: Manikantha Misra and Sasadhara  
  Manikantha 375
  Nyiiyaratna 375
  SaSadhara 382
  Nyiiyasiddhiintadipa 382
  Mangalavada 382
  Theory of Darkness 383
  Causality 383
  Meaning of Words 384
  Reality of Power 384
  Theory of Power in the Substratum 386
  Theory of Atomicity of Manas 386
  Theory of Validity of Testimony 387
  Knowledge and Action are both Necessary for Release 387
  Theory of Release 388
  Theory of Indeterminate Perception (Nirvikalpaka pratyak~a) 389
  Theory of Consideration (Paramarsa) 389
  Theory of Pervasion (Vyapti) 390
  Theory of Ascertainment of Pervasion 390
  Theory of Injunctions (Vyaptiniscaya) 390
  Theory of Apurva (Vidhivada) 391
  Theory of Error (Khyativada) 392
  Theory of Presumption (Arthapatti) 392
  The Theory that Words are Eternal 393
  Proofs for the Existence of God 394
  Theory of Negation (Abhava) 394
  Injunction 395
  Apurva 396
  Error 397
  Arthapatti 397
  Section III: Cangesa  
  Perception 399
  Introduction 399
  On Auspicious Performance 405
  On Knowing Veridicality 405
  On Production of Veridical Cognition 407
  On Defining Veridical Awareness 408
  On the Nyaya Theory of Error 409
  On Defining Perception 410
  On Sensory Connection 411
  On Inherence 412
  On Non-Cognition 413
  On Absence 414
  On the Connection of the Sense Object and Light 415
  On the Perceptibility of Air 416
  On the Fiery Character of Gold 416
  On the Mind's Atomicity 417
  On Apperception 419
  On Indeterminate Perception 420
  On Qualifiers Versus Indicators 420
  On Determinate Perception 422
  Annotated Bibliography 424
  Inference 424
  Introduction 429
  On Inferential Awareness 429
  On Characterizing Pervasion 430
  On the Way Pervasion is Grasped 431
  On Co un terfactual Reasoning 432
  On the Uniformity of Pervasions 432
  On the Sensory Connection Characteristic of Unexperienced 432
  Instances of Universals  
  On the Inferential Undercutting Condition 433
  On Being an Inferential Subject 435
  On 'Consideration' 435
  On the 'Exclusively Positive' Inference 436
  On the 'Exclusively Negative' Inference 437
  On Circumstantial Implication 438
  On the Members of a Formal Presentation of an 'Inference for Others' 439
  On (Types of) Apparent (Non-genuine) Probans 440
  On Inquiry into (Establishing) God 442
  On Causality 443
  On 'Liberation' 445
  Annotated .Bibliography 446
  Uparnana 448
  Comparison 448
  Verbal Testimony 449
  Expectancy, Semantic Fitness, Contiguity 452
  Gangesa's Theory of Consequence not Immediately Preceded by its Cause 452
  Theory of Injunctions 452
  Cangesa's Theory of Meaning 455
  Cangesa's Theory of Injunctions 461
  The Meaning of Ought-Sentences 463
  The Meaning of a Word 464
  Gangesa's Theory of Release 465
  The Inference for God's Existence 467
  Preface 471
  Yajfiapati Upadhyaya 472
  Inferential Awareness 472
  Absence Limited by a Property whose Loci are Different from 472
  its Counter-positive  
  General Absence 472
  Particular Absence 473
  The Means of Grasping Pervasion 473
  Reductio Ad Absurdum 473
  Perception through Connection with the Universal 473
  On Obstruction 474
  Being the Paksa 474
  Consideration 474
  Only Negative Inference 474
  Members of an Inference 475
  Fallacies: General Definition 475
  Too-Generalness 475
  too-Specific 475
  Contradictoriness 475
  Counterbalanced Hetu 475
  Sublated 476
  Fallacies are Serviceable as they Point out Inefficiencies 476
  Rucidatta Misra 476
  Invocation 476
  Truth 476
  Error 477
  The Definition of Perception 477
  Sense Object Connection 477
  Connection of Content and I1Iumination 478
  Perceptibility of Wind 478
  Atomicity of the Internal Organ 478
  AEtercognition 478
  Indeterminate Perception 478
  Qualifier and Indicator 479
  Determinate Perception 479
  Inference 479
  Pervasion 479
  General and Particular Ab ences 479
  The Means of Grasping Pervasion 479
  Tarka 480
  Comprehensiveness of Pervasion 480
  On Obstruction 480
  Only Positive Inference 480
  Fallacies 480
  The Inference of God's Existence 481
  Causal Efficacy 481
  Language as Instrument of Knowledge 481
  Expectancy 481
  Semantic Fitness 481
  Contiguity 482
  Speaker's Intention 482
  Sounds Destroyed, not Concealed 482
  Injunction 482
  Apurva 482
  Verbal Potency (II) 483
  Compounds 483
  Verbal Suffixes 483
  Section IV: Raghunatha Siromani  
  Preface 485
  Padiirthatattuanirupanam 486
  Akhyatavada 489
  Didhiti on Cangesa's Tauuacinuimani 489
  Theory of Negation 490
  Perception 492
  Inference 492
  Five Definitions of Pervasion 494
  Lion-Tiger Definitions of Pervasion 495
  Absence Limited by a Property whose Loci are Different from its Counterpositive 495
  Fourteen More Faulty Definitions of Pervasion 496
  The Accepted Definition of Pervasion 497
  Examination of Limitorness 499
  General Absence 500
  Particular Absence 501
  Raghunatha's Definition of Obstruction (UPiidhi) 504
  The Means of Grasping Pervasion 504
  Reductio ad Absurdum 505
  Samanyalaksana Sannikarsa 505
  On Obstruction (UPiidht) 506
  Fallacies 507
  De~ation 508
  Inconclusive 508
  Contradictoriness (Viruddha) 509
  Counterbalanced (SatpratiPa~a) 509
  Unestablished (Asiddha) 509
  Contradiction (Biidha) 509
  Section V: Later N avya-Nyaya Theory  
  General Theory 511
  Meaning and Scepticism 511
  Spoken and Written Language 512
  What Can One Possibly Hear? 513
  Spoken and Written Sentences 516
  The Import of Sentences 519
  Meaning of Sentences 523
  Declaratory Sentences 523
  Sentences in the Imperative and Optative Moods 524
  Ought-sentences 525
  Nature of Pervasion 530
  A Comparative Study of Jag ad is a and Mathuranatha 535
  jagadisa's Theory of Sentence Meaning 536
  jagadisa on Meaning of Words 537
  Cadadhara's Theory of Word-meaning 537
  Some future problems of the Word-meaing 540
A. What does a word Mean? 540
B. Types if Cimpound words 541
  Gadadhara's Theory of anaphora 542
  Index 551

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