Some Reflections on the Philosophy of Action (An Old and Rare Book)

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In the present work the author intends to show that 'actions' proper, human and humane, occupy a distinct place in the physical world of 'events' including the instinctive, spontaneous, non-conscious activities. The former being essentially intentional, necessarily involves self-consciousness which, in turn, manifests itself through man's freedom of will, choice, and decision. Relevant views held by eminent thinkers have been discussed and evaluated. The principal problem that the entire discourse centres round, has been considered from various standpoints, including the existentialist and the scientific points of view. And a serious effort has been made to settle the point at issue on the scientific ground. It may be assured that the readers will go through the book with pleasure and profit mainly because of lucidity of expression, precision of exposition and absence of redundant repetitions.

Born in 1938, the author passed the B.A. Examination of the University of Calcutta, with Honours in Philosophy in 1958, and the M.A. Examination of the same University in the same subject in 1960. Thence onward he has been deeply engaged in philosophical research resulting in the following publications: (i) An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Existentialism; Firma KLM Pvt. Ltd.: Calcutta, 1979; (ii) Astibader Marmaka ha: (Essentials of Existentialism) West Bengal State Book Board Calcutta, 1988;

As also the present one. An ardent advocate of Scientific Philosophy, the author is still going on with his studies with a keen mind to make way for further publications. The author has been associated with S.B. College, an Institution in the district of Hooghly, West Bengal, as a Teacher in Philosophy since 1962, and also with Vidyasagar University as a Guest Lecturer in Philosophy for a few years.

The present work intends to present a brief, yet precise, account of the conflicting opinions held by some modern philosophers, Quine, Davidson and others, about whether 'actions' should be posited as distinct from, or should be reduced to, physical 'events'. The advocates of the former view maintain that unlike the physical 'events', 'actions' are not caused. For them, we should give an account of an event in reference to its cause, and account for an action on reason. The edifice of the entire controversy is founded on the traditional dichotomy between the Mental and the Physical. The problem is whether the dichotomy is tenable even today. For Quine, the dichotomy is obsolete or archaic'. Davidson, however, attempts a reconciliation between these two conflicting views, which is based on his Anomalous Monism. He suggests that it is by way of verbal re-exposition or re-description of the Mental in physical terms that the Mental may be reduced to the Physical, an 'action' to an 'event', by a reference to its 'primary reason' which, he contends, is as good as the cause. But this reduction is more linguistic than factual. The present discourse shows in the end that a reconciliation based on the standpoint of modern Science clearly points to the qualitative distinction between Event and Action, and is, as such, of considerable congency.

The work begins with an account of 'events' and their 'causes' and thereafter, it has been confirmed on scientific grounds that the physical events are bound by causal Necessity. The third chapter dwells upon whether actions consciously done by man are required to be explained (accounted for) on rational grounds only. The chapter ends with an account of Davidson's attempt to reconcile the conflicting opinions by way of his Anomalous Monism.